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Abstract
Background: The US government proposes pandemic influenza mitigation guidance that includes isolation and antiviral
treatment of ill persons, voluntary household member quarantine and antiviral prophylaxis, social distancing of individuals,
school closure, reduction of contacts at work, and prioritized vaccination. Is this the best strategy combination? Is choice of
this strategy robust to pandemic uncertainties? What are critical enablers of community resilience?
Methods and Findings: We systematically simulate a broad range of pandemic scenarios and mitigation strategies using a
networked, agent-based model of a community of explicit, multiply-overlapping social contact networks. We evaluate
illness and societal burden for alterations in social networks, illness parameters, or intervention implementation. For a 1918-
like pandemic, the best strategy minimizes illness to ,1% of the population and combines network-based (e.g. school
closure, social distancing of all with adults’ contacts at work reduced), and case-based measures (e.g. antiviral treatment of
the ill and prophylaxis of household members). We find choice of this best strategy robust to removal of enhanced
transmission by the young, additional complexity in contact networks, and altered influenza natural history including
extended viral shedding. Administration of age-group or randomly targeted 50% effective pre-pandemic vaccine with 7%
population coverage (current US H5N1 vaccine stockpile) had minimal effect on outcomes. In order, mitigation success
depends on rapid strategy implementation, high compliance, regional mitigation, and rigorous rescinding criteria; these are
the critical enablers for community resilience.
Conclusions: Systematic evaluation of feasible, recommended pandemic influenza interventions generally confirms the US
community mitigation guidance yields best strategy choices for pandemic planning that are robust to a wide range of
uncertainty. The best strategy combines network- and case-based interventions; network-based interventions are
paramount. Because strategies must be applied rapidly, regionally, and stringently for greatest benefit, preparation and
public education is required for long-lasting, high community compliance during a pandemic.
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Introduction
Background
Human influenza pandemics of unpredictable severity and
consequence are considered inevitable. Studies using computa-
tional models have examined roles of border controls, internal
travel restrictions, treatment and prophylaxis with antivirals,
isolation of cases, quarantine of household members, school
closure, and partially effective vaccine on limiting outbreak sizes
[1–7]. Others have modeled a pandemic at large scale either from
a source in SE Asia [8,9], or within the US or Great Britain
[10,11] in order to describe effects of vaccination, school closures,
and voluntary or imposed partial or total community member
quarantine. Still others have focused at the community scale to
consider community containment options [12–14]. The findings
from these and other large and small scale simulation studies
underpin the US government’s Interim Pre-pandemic Planning
Guidance: Community Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Mitigation in the
United States [15].
Yet, these studies have explored the influence of mitigation
strategies through a limited set of defining scenarios. Many
questions are left unanswered: Which combinations of interven-
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and societal disruption on a community scale? Is the choice of a
best strategy robust to biologic, physical, and behavioral human
and viral heterogeneity? What are the most important enabling
components of effective community mitigation that yield a resilient
community, able to surmount a pandemic’s effects?
To address these questions, we systematically and broadly
explored the effectiveness of community mitigation strategies with
a networked, agent-based computational model. Our model, Loki-
Infect, simulates transmission within the explicit social contact
network of a stylized community. It is parsimonious, incorporating
only the critical details that are required to answer our stated
questions. We began with a base set of model parameters and ran
simulations of a core matrix of 64 community mitigation strategies
formed by combinations of 8 independent interventions that
encompass the US government’s planning guidance [15]. We
examined a range of influenza severity from a seasonal influenza
outbreak to twice that of the 1918 influenza pandemic and varied
model structures and parameter assumptions through an extensive
set of perturbations and extensions. From the results, we chose and
present the combination of interventions that best limit illness,
death, and societal disruption in the face of a 1918-like pandemic
and show that this best choice is robust to the model uncertainties
considered. Finally, by examining the dependence of strategy
effectiveness on parameter variation we identify the critical
enablers of community resilience.
Methods
Loki-Infect is a networked agent-based computational model
developed by the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis
Center (NISAC) at Sandia National Laboratories. In this model,
agents represent individuals of various age classes who are linked
to each other within and among social groups (such as households,
neighborhoods, school classes, clubs, businesses, etc.) to form an
explicit contact network reflective of a multiply-overlapping,
structured community. Behavioral rules for individuals, their
interactions, and the performance of network links are specified to
model the spread of influenza. Community mitigation strategies
are implemented through modifications of these behavioral rules
when a given strategy is imposed during a simulation. In context of
pandemic influenza, Loki-Infect has been applied to evaluate
social distancing strategies [13], design targeted social distancing
[14], evaluate rescinding criteria for mitigation measures [12], and
design community containment strategies [16].
A simulation begins by creating a community (in the current
case composed of 10,000 individuals) and then seeding it with the
infection of an initial group of randomly-chosen community
adults. These adults become infectious and may infect others,
depending on their contacts and the contacts’ age-related
susceptibility. Fifty percent of infected persons become ill, 80%
of ill persons are ‘‘diagnosed’’ with the pandemic virus and go
home where they decrease their interactions with others outside
the household. If the sick person is a child, a well adult from the
household stays home with the child. Two percent of those that are
ill die, the remainder recover. If the simulation includes use of
mitigation interventions, these begin immediately at a predefined
number of incident cases (10, 30, or 100), are carried out by the
community with a specified level of compliance (60% or 90%), and
end at a defined threshold of number of new cases in a 7 day
period (0 or 3). This immediate implementation includes
distribution and administration of antivirals, which is a best case
situation. Subsequently, if the number of newly diagnosed
individuals rises above the implementation threshold, mitigation
strategies are reapplied with a second mitigation cycle. If required,
additional cycles based on these beginning and rescinding
thresholds are implemented until no infected individuals remain
within the community and the simulation ends.
Complete model details are provided in the Supplemental
Information (Methods S1). Included in Methods S1 are
specifications of the basic contact network, behavioral rules for
the spread of influenza, alternative manifestations of influenza
natural history, alternative networks used for infectious contacts,
variation of viral infectivity, instigation and boundary condition
alternatives, community mitigation interventions, and simulation
study design. Links to Excel tables of results are included in
Methods S1; full data and the model code are available on
request from the authors.
We investigated 8 independent mitigation interventions defined
in Table 1. Network-based interventions affect links and contacts
between individuals throughout the entire network and are:
School closure (S), Child and Teen social distancing (CTsd), and
Adult and Senior social distancing (ASsd) (where adults continue
to attend work, although at a 50% reduction in contacts at the
workplace). Case-based interventions are applied directly to or
around diagnosed individuals to limit transmission and are:
household Quarantine (Q), antiviral Treatment (T), household
antiviral Prophylaxis (P), and Extended contact Prophylaxis (PEx).
Each intervention is implemented singly or in combinations as
strategies to yield an 8 by 8 combinatory matrix (Table 2).
Antiviral interventions T, P and PEx are nested, with P necessarily
incorporating T, and PEx necessarily incorporating both T and P.
For all, a compliance factor is applied that specifies the percentage
of individuals that comply with interventions.
Core Analysis
For our core analysis we used the base contact network from
previous Loki-Infect studies [12–14,16]. This base network models
mathematically both a closed community with no external
interactions as well as a fully open community that is in interaction
with like communities implementing identical mitigation strategies
and similarly seeded with infectious individuals. The fully open
community may also be thought of as geographically contiguous
with other identical communities to compose a larger city.
Contacts among any of the groups outside the household could
therefore originate from anywhere within the city. We refer to the
use of this base contact network as ‘regional mitigation’.
We used a natural history of influenza for the core analysis that
conforms closely to Ferguson et al. [8,10]. Because of expected
high morbidity associated with a pandemic strain, we add a mean
7 day recovery period after the symptomatic period to the
Ferguson-like manifestation for those individuals who are
diagnosed and withdraw to the home. During this recovery
period, individuals continue to stay at home but are not infectious.
Compliance of 90%, a strategy implementation threshold of 10
diagnosed individuals and a strategy rescinding threshold of 7 days
with no newly diagnosed individuals was used for the core analysis
as a possible best case, reflecting a situation of excellent
surveillance and community participation.
Perturbations and Extensions
To evaluate the sensitivity of our core model parameters and
identify critical enablers of resilience, we varied parameters and
model assumptions within a range thought to bound realism:
relaxed compliance (60%); delayed strategy implementation
thresholds (day after 30 or 100 individuals are diagnosed within
the community); relaxed rescinding of strategies (3 cases in 7 days).
We also implemented local-only mitigation; alternative influenza
Mitigation-Pandemic Influenza
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 July 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 7 | e2606natural history (Longini-like and Longini-like with an extended
period of infectiousness); two alternative contact networks (similar
transmission by all age classes or augmented with additional
contact groups); and availability of pre-pandemic vaccine (uniform
or age class targeted). Details of all these perturbations and
extensions are given in Methods S1. Below we provide salient
features.
To remove our core assumption of regional implementation of
like mitigation strategies, we simulated a community embedded
within a region doing nothing to abate the epidemic, referred to as
‘local-only mitigation’. In local-only mitigation, contact with the
external regional population occurs exclusively through the work
environment. This would represent a town where workers
commute from elsewhere or a city where non-household contacts
are from within the neighborhood, except at work, where all
contacts are from outside.
As a firstalternative manifestationofinfluenzanaturalhistory, we
implemented that of Longini and colleagues [9,11]. The critical
differences between the Ferguson-like influenza natural history used
in our core analysis and that of the Longini-like are the proportion
of infected individuals who develop clinical illness (50% in our core
analysis vs. 67% for Longini) and a somewhat extended period of
infectiousness. As with the Ferguson-like manifestation, a recovery
period with a mean of 7 days is added after the symptomatic period
for those individuals who are diagnosed and withdraw to the home.
As a second alternative manifestation of influenza natural history,
we added an extended period of shedding that may accompany
particularlynovel strains(such asmay occur with the H5N1 subtype
affecting humans) [17,18]. Consequently, the Longini-like manifes-
tation’s period of infectiousness was extended to the end of the
recovery period. As a first alternative contact network, we made
transmission capability similar for the young and adults. The
enhanced relative infectivity and susceptibility for children and
teenagers wasremovedand the numberof contacts for adultswithin
the workplace was increased to put them on par with children and
teenagers in schools. While we believe these two characteristics are
unlikely in combination, they represent one extreme that bounds
uncertainty in the resulting network of infectious contacts. As a
second alternative contact network, we augmented the network by
placing all 0 to 5 year old children in preschool or play groups and
adding child, teen, adult and senior social clubs, teen friend groups,
and adult task groups to the basic contact network. Children and
teenagers were also given additional random networks to reflect, for
example, hallway passing within schools. Finally, the number of
links within child classes was increased and the average frequency of
contactperlink inextended families orneighborhoods wasreduced.
Thisalternative network was guided by on a recent characterization
of contact networks for children and teenagers [19].
As a final extension, we considered the availability of 50%
effective pre-pandemic vaccine applied with 7% community
coverage in 3 vaccination strategies: either randomly administered
to community members, targeted to children and teens, or targeted
to adults. Thisconstitutes a level of availability and assumed efficacy
of the proposed pre-pandemic vaccine stockpile in the US [20].
Administering pre-pandemic vaccine to adults reflects a proposed
strategy of providing vaccine to protect critical workers [21].
Table 1. Mitigation Interventions.
Intervention Definition
S Schools closed, all school contacts reduced by 90%, household contacts doubled. One adult from each household with a child (11 or younger)
stays home from work.
CTsd Social distancing of children and teenagers. All non-school and non-household contacts with or between children and teenagers reduced by
60% and 90%, household contacts doubled.
ASsd Social distancing of adults and seniors. All non-household, non-work contacts within and between adults and seniors reduced by 60% and
90%, work contacts reduced by 50%; household contacts doubled.
Q Household quarantine for 10 days once an individual in the household is diagnosed, all non-household contacts reduced by 60% or 90%,
household contacts doubled.
T Antiviral treatment. Individual given antiviral course with probability (60%, 90%) for 5 days immediately after diagnosis, reduces infectivity by
60% [8,10]
P Household member antiviral prophylaxis. Household members given an antiviral with probability (60%, 90%) for 10 days starting immediately
after household reference case is diagnosed, reduces infection susceptibility by 30%, reduces probability of clinical illness by 65%, reduces
infectivity by 60% [8,10]
PEx Extended contact prophylaxis. Household members, workplace contacts, school contacts, work contacts, and neighborhood/extended family
contacts of a case are given antivirals with probability (60%, 90%) for 10 days starting immediately after reference case diagnosed; reduces
infection susceptibility by 30%; reduces probability of clinical illness by 65%; reduces infectivity by 60%. (Note that school and workplace
contact rates used for PEx are much less than the entire school or work groups.)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002606.t001
Table 2. Combinatory strategy matrix: Case-based as rows,
network-based as columns.
None ASsd CTsd
CTsd,
ASsd S
S,
ASsd
S,
CTsd
S, CTsd
ASsd
None None
T
Q
P
Q,T
Q,P
PEx
Q,PEx All
S=schools closed; CTsd=child/teenager social distancing; ASsd=adult/senior
socials distancing; Q=household quarantine; T=antiviral treatment;
P=antiviral prophylaxis of household members; PEx=extended antiviral
prophylaxis. Case-based interventions are applied directly to or around
diagnosed individuals to limit transmission (T, Q, P, PEx). Network-based
interventions are applied to affect links and contacts between individuals
throughout the entire network (ASsd, CTsd, S).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002606.t002
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For each combination of parameters and model assumptions
that define an intervention combination for the core analysis or
perturbations and extensions to examine sensitivity, we varied the
viral infectivity about a base defined by an infection rate of 50%,
representative of the 1958 pandemic [10]. We scale this base
infectivity by factors (IF) of 0.75, 1.0, 1.25, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5 and 3.0 to
yield lower and higher infection rates. An IF of 1.5 results in the
current accepted infectivity for the 1918–1920 pandemic,
equivalent to an R0 of about 2.0 (R0 is the number of secondary
infections produced by one individual in a susceptible population;
when R0 is ,1.0 an epidemic cannot continue to propagate
[22,23]). Epidemic severity is a combination of viral infectivity,
which determines how many people are infected, and the case
fatality rate, which determines how many people die [15]. While
any case fatality rate can be applied to the simulation results, we
present a common rate of 2% of those with clinical illness (clinical
illness occurs in 50% of those infected) as was thought to be
reflective of the 1918 pandemic [23].
To capture the stochastic variability that is inherent and
expected due to the variability of social network structure,
individual links and contacts, and those who are initially infected,
we conducted 100 simulations for each combination of parame-
ters. Across the entire simulation set (core, perturbations,
extensions), nearly 2 million simulations were conducted in total.
Only those simulations that created epidemics (defined as greater
than 1 percent of the population infected) were used in analysis of
outcomes.
Results
We first briefly describe the core analysis, we then use the results
to design a community mitigation strategy for a 1918-like
pandemic, and finally we test the sensitivity of this design to
perturbations of the parameters and assumptions of the model. We
focus on the outcome measures of infection rates (to which deaths
are directly related), the average number of days adults are at
home (either sick, quarantined in the home, or tending children
sick or dismissed from school) and the community antiviral
coverage required for a particular strategy. Full results and their
discussion can be found in the Results and Appendices in
Methods S1. Other outcome measures available in Methods S1
include the number of simulations that yield epidemics, cumulative
illness rates, deaths, peak numbers of infected or symptomatic
individuals, time to peak infected or symptomatic, epidemic
duration, total time of epidemic effects, number of days strategies
are imposed, number of strategy cycles needed, and number of
infections resulting from external community contacts.
Core Analysis
Table 3 displays outcomes for unmitigated epidemics at
infectivity factors (IF) from seasonal influenza-like (IF .75) to twice
1918-like (IF 3.0) and compares them to the US Pandemic Severity
Index (PSI) [15]. Again, a case fatality rate of 2% of those with
clinical illness (thought to be reflective of 1918) is used across all IF.
For any IF, different case fatality rates and thus severities can be
obtained by rescaling the number of deaths resulting from these
simulations. As a further reminder, the core analysis reflects the
basic contact network with Ferguson-like natural history of
influenza, 90 percent compliance, rapid implementation (day
after 10 cases diagnosed), restrictive rescinding (0 cases in 7 days)
and regional mitigation.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 show results for combinatory intervention
matrices over the range of epidemic infectivity (IF) for the
outcomes of infection rates, adult days at home, and antiviral
courses used, respectively. Network-based and case-based inter-
ventions applied alone or in combination as strategies yield
banded green zones where infection rates are 10 percent or less,
and pink zones where infection rates are 10 to 25 percent. The
less-than-10-percent green zone is concentrated where more
interventions are imposed (the lower right corners of each IF
region). An infection rate of 10 percent (green zone) corresponds to
a symptomatic illness rate of 5 percent and a diagnosed rate of 4
percent. An infection rate of 25 percent (pink zone) corresponds to
a symptomatic illness rate of 12.5 percent and a diagnosis rate of
10 percent.
Combinations of network-based interventions can effectively
reduce infection rates to less than 10% of the population up to an
IF of 1.5 (Figure 1). Above an IF of 1.5, combinations of network-
and case-based interventions are required. At the lowest IF (0.75),
the efficacy of network-based interventions applied alone increases
from ASsd, CTsd, CTsd+ASsd, S, S+ASsd, to S+CTsd or
S+CTsd+ASsd. At an IDF of 1.5, this order changes, increasing
from CTsd, S, ASsd, CTsd+ASsd, S+ASsd, S+CTsd, to
S+CTsd+ASsd. As IF rises, combinations that include S or ASsd
increase in efficacy over those with CTsd alone (because CTsd
removes non-school contacts but leaves within-school contacts of
children and teenagers). Efficacy of ASsd improves because with
increasing IF, the branching factor for adults in the unmitigated
epidemic, which is akin to an age class specific R0, is pushed above
1.0. Thus, adult contacts become responsible for a larger share of
transmission. Since there are more adults in the community,
restricting them contributes more to overall epidemic control.
For case-based interventions applied without any network-based
interventions, the efficacy increases from T through Q, P, Q+T,
Q+P, and PEx, to Q+PEx (Figure 1). This order does not change
as IF increases. For an epidemic above an IF of 0.75, case-based
strategies alone cannot contain the infection rate below 10 percent.
Note that the model implements use of case-based measures
immediately on the 10 case trigger, which would be an unrealistic
situation in any community, given difficulties in antiviral
distribution.
Containing infection rates to less than 10 percent significantly
reduced the total overall burden to the community as measured by
the number of days that adults are at home (Figure 2).
Table 3. Pandemic outcomes for unmitigated epidemics by
IF
*.
IF
0.75 1 1.5 3
% Infected 29 50 71 92
% Symptomatic 14 25 36 46
No. of deaths 28 50 71 92
No. of adult days at home 12 3 4
Epidemic duration (days) 104 61 42 27
PSI equivalent
{ ,1 1 to 2 4 to 5 not on PSI scale
*IF is scaled disease infectivity (uses transmissibility as a measure of pandemic
severity).
{PSI is the pandemic severity index from [15], a scale of predicted pandemic
impact based on early estimation of case fatality rate.
Case fatality rate here is .02 across all IF.
Results are for simulations (of 100 done for each IF) that produced epidemics.
An epidemic is defined as when .1.0% of population is infected.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002606.t003
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S+CTsd alone (e.g. 14 vs. 25 days, respectively, for IF 1.5 where no
case based interventions are applied). Implementing S is the major
component of the adult days at home measure because in the
model, when a child (11 or younger) is diagnosed with influenza or
when schools are closed, one household adult stays home to care
for the child, and closing the schools requires approximately 22%
of adults to be at home minding children. Assuming all these adult
days at home are a loss to work productivity is a worst-case
assessment. It is likely that some child-minding adults would
maintain reasonable work productivity during school closures,
because they usually work at home, or through telecommuting,
time shifting, or job sharing. Additionally, teenagers present within
the household could care for children and thus release the adult
babysitter to attend work.
For all strategies that result in infection rates of 10 percent or
less (the green zone), no more than 48% population coverage with
antivirals is required, and this high value only occurs at an IF of 3
where all interventions are applied (Figure 3). If PEx is excluded,
a maximum of only 8 percent antiviral coverage is required and
Figure 1. Percentage of population infected. S=schools closed; CTsd=child/teenager social distancing; ASsd=adult/senior socials distancing;
Q=household quarantine; T=antiviral treatment; P=antiviral prophylaxis of household members; PEx=extended antiviral prophylaxis. For
Ferguson-like disease manifestation and implementation threshold when 10 cases are diagnosed. Case-based interventions are applied directly to or
around diagnosed individuals to limit transmission and are: Q, T, P, and PEx. Network-based interventions are applied to affect links and contacts
between individuals throughout the entire network and are: S, CTsd, ASsd (where adults continue to attend work, although at a 50% reduction in
contacts at the workplace). Case-based interventions vertical; network-based interventions horizontal. Green shading denotes infection rates #10
percent of population. Pink shading denotes infection rates between 10 and 25 percent.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002606.g001
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less, required antiviral coverage is far less. Applying PEx alone as a
strategy results in less than 10 percent infected only at an IF of
0.75. At higher IF, applying PEx necessitates antiviral coverage of
as much as 150 percent of the population, where each individual
receives an antiviral course an average of 1.5 times over the course
of the epidemic. This greater-than-100-percent coverage is also
very ineffective in limiting infection rates to less than 10 or even 25
percent of the population.
Designing Community Mitigation for 1918-like (PSI 4 to
5) Pandemic
It is reasonable to plan to mitigate a pandemic like one the
world has experienced. For an unmitigated 1918-like pandemic
Figure 2. Average adult days at home. S=schools closed; CTsd=child/teenager social distancing; ASsd=adult/senior socials distancing;
Q=household quarantine; T=antiviral treatment; P=antiviral prophylaxis of household members; PEx=extended antiviral prophylaxis. For
Ferguson-like disease manifestation and implementation threshold when 10 cases are diagnosed. Case-based interventions are applied directly to or
around diagnosed individuals to limit transmission and are: Q, T, P, and PEx. Network-based interventions are applied to affect links and contacts
between individuals throughout the entire network and are: S, CTsd, ASsd (where adults continue to attend work, although at a 50% reduction in
contacts at the workplace). Case-based interventions vertical; network-based interventions horizontal. Green shading denotes infection rates #10
percent of population. Pink shading denotes infection rates between 10 and 25 percent.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002606.g002
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infected, 36 percent of the infected are symptomatic, and 2 percent
of the symptomatic die. Figure 4 displays average daily numbers
of infections, symptomatic cases, individuals given antivirals, and
adult days at home plotted over time for the full set of 100
simulations of an unmitigated IF 1.5 epidemic compared to plots of
epidemics with various combinations of network- and case-based
interventions employed.
Figure 1, IF 1.5 region, shows that a quarter of the strategies
yield results with ,10 percent infected (green). However,
implementing all case-based interventions without network-based
interventions can result, at best, in an infection rate of 35 percent
(also see Figure 4b). Implementing all network-based interven-
tions alone can reduce the infection rate to 5 percent (also see
Figure 4c). The nonlinearity in the combination of social
distancing interventions is of note. S or CTsd alone are not very
Figure 3. Population antiviral coverage. S=schools closed; CTsd=child/teenager social distancing; ASsd=adult/senior socials distancing;
Q=household quarantine; T=antiviral treatment; P=antiviral prophylaxis of household members; PEx=extended antiviral prophylaxis. For
Ferguson-like disease manifestation and implementation threshold when 10 cases are diagnosed. Case-based interventions are applied directly to or
around diagnosed individuals to limit transmission and are: Q, T, P, and PEx. Network-based interventions are applied to affect links and contacts
between individuals throughout the entire network and are: S, CTsd, ASsd (where adults continue to attend work, although at a 50% reduction in
contacts at the workplace). Case-based interventions vertical; network-based interventions horizontal. Green shading denotes infection rates #10
percent of population. Pink shading denotes infection rates between 10 and 25 percent.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002606.g003
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to 17 percent, an efficacy far greater than when they are singly
imposed. In contrast, combining S and ASsd only reduces the
infection rate to 50 percent, less than their linear combination
when singly imposed (Figure 1, IF 1.5 region).
In the unmitigated epidemic, adults are home an average of 3
days. For mitigation strategies that yield infection rates of 10
percent or less, adults stay at home an average of 6 to 19 days
(Figure 2, IF 1.5 green region). Importantly, the lowest number of
adult days at home is found when implementing all network-based
interventions layered with case-based interventions.
Without the use of antivirals, 3 strategies result in infection rates
below 10 percent (S+CTsd+ASsd; Q+S+CTsd; Q+CTsd+ASsd),
all of which necessitate 12 or more adult days at home. When
antivirals are unavailable or ineffective, adding Q to network-
based strategies decreases infection rates. For example, with
S+CTsd+ASsd, 5% are infected with 14 adult days at home.
Adding Q (Q+ S+CTsd+ASsd), 4% are infected and adult days at
home are 12. But, with effective antivirals (P or PEx implemented)
applying Q is of little additional value and increases the number of
days adults are at home from 6 to 7 (also compare Figure 4d and
Figure 4e). This finding differs from the US community
mitigation guidance [15]. Interestingly, only 2% of the population
must be covered with antivirals using P while 10% coverage is
required for PEx, with no added benefit in reduced illness, death
or adult days at home. (Figures 1–3, IF 1.5 region)
Thus, for a 1918-like pandemic, the community mitigation
strategy that minimizes illness and death (2% infected) also
minimizes the average number of adult days at home (6 days). This
best strategy combines full social distancing interventions with
antivirals used for household prophylaxis and treatment
(P+S+CTsd+ASsd) (Figure 4d). We also find that with
P+S+CTsd+ASsd in place, the minimum population coverage of
antivirals is required (2%). Because such a strategy would have
considerable societal effects, it would likely be acceptable to a
community only in a pandemic with a significant mortality rate.
Sensitivity of Design for a 1918-like (PSI 4 to 5) Pandemic
Critical results from our evaluation of the sensitivity of the
chosen best strategy design for a 1918-like pandemic are displayed
in Figures 5 and 6. Across all model perturbations and
extensions, the community mitigation strategy that is best does not
change, and thus its choice is robust to all considered perturbations.
However, some perturbations erode the efficacy more than others
and demonstrate the critical enablers of effective mitigation. Full
results are available in the extensive set of simulations reported in
Methods S1, Tables 9 to 39, and Appendices. Below we
present the results for each, ordered relative to their descending
influence on 1) the percentage of the population infected and 2)
other measures when the percent infected were the same.
Additional comparisons are added where relevant.
Implementation Threshold. Delaying implementation until
100 individuals are diagnosed (from 10 diagnosed) erodes efficacy
of the best strategy most significantly (Figure 5e). The infection
rate reaches 13%, adult days at home increase to 12, and an
antiviral stockpile of 11 percent coverage is required. Delaying
strategy implementation until 30 cases occur also costs the
community. More infections occur (5% vs. 2%), more antiviral is
required (4%), and the average number of adult days at home
increases slightly (to 7 days).
Compliance. Reducing compliance to 60 percent from 90
percent also erodes efficacy significantly (Figure 5b). Infection
rates increase fivefold to 10% as well as do resulting deaths. Almost
7 percent antiviral coverage is required (vs. 2 percent), and adult
days at home increases from 6 to 21.
Local-Only Mitigation. In a situation of local-only
mitigation, the community has less success at controlling
epidemics (Figure 5c and 5d). Infection rates more than
quadruple relative to the situation of regionally applied
mitigation (increasing from 2% to 9%). Antiviral requirements
increase to 9 percent coverage, and adult days at home double, to
12 days.
Rescinding Threshold. Relaxing the rescinding threshold to
3 cases/7 days still results in an infection rate of less than 6%
(Figure 5f). However, the duration of the epidemic increases from
20 days to 55 days. The longer epidemic duration occurs because
the average number of mitigation cycles increases from 1 to 3. The
percentage of the population requiring antivirals increases from
2% to 5% and adult days at home increase from 6 to 9 days.
Alternative Natural History of Influenza–Longini-like
with Extended Period of Infectiousness. The extended
period of infectiousness added to the Longini-like manifestation
increases the infected population slightly, to 3% from 2% for the
Ferguson-like manifestation. Antiviral coverage likewise increases
to 3% from 2%. However, the adult days at home quadruple from
6 days to 24 (vs. 10 for the Longini manifestation without the
extended period of infectiousness), reflecting the markedly
increased epidemic duration (to 117 days compared to 64 days
for the original Longini-like manifestation) (Figure 6c).
Alternative Natural History of Influenza–Longini-
like. Changing the influenza natural history to reflect that of
Longini (0.67 of infected persons develop clinical illness; individual
infectivity is uniform from the pre-symptomatic period through the
end of recovery) produces infection rates with network- and case-
based strategies implemented very similar to those based on the
Ferguson-like manifestation (Figure 6b). This holds true with
reduced compliance and local-only mitigation as well. The best
strategy produces the same results as the Ferguson-like
manifestation on infection rates (both 2%); however, the cost in
terms of adult days at home increases from 6 days to 10 days. This
occurs because of the effects of the increased illness/infection ratio
in the Longini manifestation. Antiviral coverage required is slightly
higher in the Longini manifestation (3%) for the same reason.
Similar Transmission across Age Classes. If similar
transmission across age classes is assumed, there is no difference
in infection rates compared to when the best strategy is in place in
the core network (both 2%) or antiviral coverage needed (both 2%)
(Figure 6d). The average duration of epidemics is longer for the
similar transmission network (27 vs. 20 days for our core network
with best strategy). Accordingly, adult days out of work increase
from 6 to 7 days. However, there is a significant difference in
efficacy with local-only mitigation (9% infected in the core
network vs. 25% in the similar transmission network at 90%
compliance; antiviral requirements increase accordingly from 9%
to 41%). This degradation in efficacy of the best strategy results
from the four-fold increase in adult contacts in the work
environment. These contacts are assumed to take place with
adults from surrounding communities where the epidemic is
unchecked.
Augmented Social Network. When additional contact
groups are added for children and teenagers, less than 2 percent
of the population is infected, 2 percent antiviral coverage required,
and 7 adult days at home are needed in an epidemic of 26 days’
duration with the best strategy applied (Figure 6e).
Pre-pandemic Vaccine. Adding 50% effective (at
prevention of transmission) pre-pandemic vaccine at proposed
US stockpile levels of 7% population coverage [20] influences the
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 July 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 7 | e2606Figure 4. Epidemic effects without and with various mitigation strategies. Plots of numbers of individuals infected, symptomatic, given
antivirals, and adult days at home by day of pandemic without mitigation strategies and with mitigation strategies applied for an IF 1.5 (1918-like;
Pandemic Severity Index [PSI] 4–5 pandemic); with Ferguson-like disease manifestation and strategies implemented at 90% compliance with regional
mitigation. Plots are averages of all 100 simulations done. Comparisons are to the plot with no mitigation strategies applied. a—no mitigation
strategies applied. Note the early peak of 1500 symptomatic cases at day 28 and that approximately 900 adults (9% of the population) are at home
from illness at peak. Epidemic effects end by day 60. b—all case-based interventions applied (Q+PEx). Note the significant requirements for antiviral
drugs (.30% of population receives antivirals at peak). Symptomatic cases are contained to ,250 at peak and adult days at home peak at 500 from
illness or home quarantine. The epidemic effects last for 160 days. c—all network-based interventions applied (S+CTsd+ASsd). Note the significant,
sustained increase in adult days at home because of the school closings and childcare required, peaking at approximately 1400 adults home/day and
tapering off slowly. However, symptomatic cases are contained to ,200 at peak. The epidemic effects last approximately 120 days. d—the best
strategy we found in these simulations (P+S+CTsd+ASsd). Ill persons are treated with antivirals, household members of ill persons receive antiviral
prophylaxis, schools are closed and children’s and teenagers’ contacts are reduced by 90%, adults’ and seniors’ non-work contacts are decreased by
90% and workplace contacts by 50%. Note the similar peak of adult days at home (at around 1400) as when only network-based strategies are
applied, but with rapid fall-off, with nearly no adult days at home required after approximately day 50. Symptomatic cases are minimized to ,200 at
peak. Epidemic effects end around day 100. e—the best strategy (P+S+CTsd+ASsd) with Q added. Note that the addition of Q does not change the
number of symptomatic cases, but does extend required adult days at home and lengthens the epidemic effects to approximately 120 days.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002606.g004
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 July 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 7 | e2606Figure 5. Epidemic effects with perturbed parameter assumptions. Plots of IF 1.5 epidemics (Ferguson-like disease manifestation) with best
strategy applied showing effects of reduced compliance, local-only mitigation, reduced compliance and local-only mitigation, delayed
implementation threshold to 100 cases, and relaxed (3-case/7day) rescinding threshold. Plots are averages of all 100 simulations. Comparisons
are to the best strategy plot. a—the best strategy found in these simulations (P+S+CTsd+ASsd). b—best strategy applied at 60% compliance. Note
the extended duration of epidemic effects (.160 days), length of time antivirals are required, and greatly increased requirements for adult days at
home. c—best strategy applied at 90% compliance with local-only mitigation. Note the increase in use of antivirals, extended epidemic effects and
increase in adult days at home. d—best strategy applied at 60% compliance with local-only mitigation. Note the higher peaks in numbers of infected
and symptomatic near day 40, the increased use and longer duration of need for antivirals and the longer duration of epidemic effects to nearly 160
days. e—best strategy applied with delayed implementation (when 100 cases have occurred). Note the high, early peak of cases and accompanying
need for antivirals until the strategy controls the epidemic at day 120. f—best strategy applied with the 3-case/7 day rescinding threshold. Note the
extended duration of the epidemic and the erratic downslope of adult days at home as the mitigation strategy cycles off when the rescinding
threshold is met and on again when 10 cases occur (the implementation threshold).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002606.g005
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 10 July 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 7 | e2606Figure 6. Epidemic effects with extended parameter assumptions. Plots of IF 1.5 epidemics (Ferguson-like disease manifestation, at 90%
compliance, with regional mitigation) showing extensions of parameter assumptions. Plots are averages of all 100 simulations. Comparisons are to
the best strategy plot. a—the best strategy found in these simulations (P+S+CTsd+ASsd). b—best strategy under Longini-like assumptions of
influenza natural history. Note the similar peak in numbers of infected and symptomatic, but there are additional and extended requirements for
antiviral use, adult days at home and longer duration of epidemic effects. c—best strategy with Longini-like with extended period of infectiousness.
Note the elongated downslope (and overall increase) of required adult days at home and long duration of epidemic effects. d—best strategy with
similar transmission across age classes. Note the minimal increase in duration of adult days at home and duration of epidemic effects. e—best
strategy with augmented social networks. Note the slight increase in duration of adult days at home and the significantly increased duration of
epidemic effects. f—best strategy with pre-pandemic vaccine targeted to children and teenagers. Note the similarity in curves of required adult days
at home and the slightly decreased duration of epidemic effects (from 100 days to 90 days). g—best strategy and pre-pandemic vaccine targeted to
adults. Note the lack of benefit on numbers of infected, symptomatic, adult days at home and the increased duration of epidemic effects (from 100
days to 130 days).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002606.g006
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pre-pandemic vaccine only to children and teenagers (700 doses
for 2900 children; 24% coverage) decreases the community
infection rate most, from 71% to 64%. However, when the best
strategy is implemented, pre-pandemic vaccine administered
randomly among the population, targeted to children and
teenagers, or targeted to adults, has no effect on infection rates,
antiviral usage, and adult days at home (Figures 6f and 6g).
Discussion
If death or permanent sequelae of illness from an influenza
pandemic could be avoided, it might be acceptable to allow
pandemic transmission without intervention. However, history has
shown and experts warn that other pandemic consequences are
significant—economic losses from decreased work productivity,
loss of income, health care surge, and diminution of national
security. Because we cannot count on preventing deaths, effects of
illness, and societal disruption without deliberately applied
interventions, we need strategies that would stop a pandemic.
Unfortunately, stopping the global spread of an influenza
pandemic may be close to impossible. However, we can design
effective community mitigation strategies that work locally much
as thinning a forest protects it from devastating fires no matter
where lightning may hit.
In this paper, we present a wide-ranging analysis to support the
effective, robust design of community mitigation strategies. We
examine the tradeoffs of varying uses of social distancing
interventions, school closures, antivirals, and pre-pandemic
vaccine to locally halt an influenza pandemic in a simulated,
explicit, multiply-overlapping network of social contacts forming a
stylized community. By focusing on an appropriately contextual-
ized single community, which could be a rural town, a suburb, or a
neighborhood within a city, we have evaluated an extensive matrix
of mitigation strategies that bracket the proposed US community
mitigation guidelines. This exploration enables us to identify and
choose community mitigation strategies to implement that
minimize illness, death and loss of workforce regardless of
transmission to our community from outside and even if antiviral
medication or pre-pandemic vaccine were of limited supply or
effectiveness. Building on this foundation, we assess the sensitivity
of the best mitigation strategy found to variations in influenza
natural history, social network configuration, strategy implemen-
tation and rescinding thresholds, public compliance, and neigh-
boring community behavior.
For a 1918-like pandemic, the best strategy combines social
distancing of all age groups layered with antiviral treatment of ill
individuals and antiviral prophylaxis of their household. Imple-
mented rapidly at high compliance and rescinded stringently, this
strategy minimized illness to ,1 percent of the population,
required that ,2 percent of the population receive antivirals and
limited adult days spent at home to ,1 week. This best strategy
reflects the recommendations of the US community mitigation
guidance, differing only by our finding of the lack of need to
quarantine household members of ill persons if antivirals are
available and effective for prophylaxis of transmission and illness.
The choice of best strategy is robust to changes in the social
contact network that removes enhanced transmission by children
and teenagers and the number of social contact groups within all
age classes and their contacts. The choice of best strategy is also
robust to changes in the illness natural history that goes beyond the
range currently used in modeling studies found in the literature.
However, effectiveness depends on rapid implementation, a strict
rescinding criterion, regional implementation and a high degree of
public compliance for all interventions.
Based on the findings of our study, we recommend pandemic
policy in 3 areas that focus on the critical enablers of resilient
community containment: priority for the preparation and
implementation of interventions; regional vs. local application of
interventions; and targeted administration of pre-pandemic
vaccine. In addition, we recommend ongoing study of pandemic
behaviors, prevention, and mitigation to reduce existing uncer-
tainties.
The first critical recommendation for policy is that highest
priority should be given to the planning and education required
for the early triggering and high compliance implementation of
network-based interventions such as social-distancing or closing
schools, rather than for case-based interventions such as antiviral
prophylaxis or household quarantine. For a pandemic similar to
1918, administration of antiviral treatment and prophylaxis at
levels above 2 percent population coverage added no benefit and
did not remove the necessity of implementing social distancing,
closing schools, and reducing contacts within the work environ-
ment. Closing schools imposes the largest cost in days adults are at
home. However, when the network-based interventions of the best
strategy are layered with antiviral treatment and prophylaxis of
households, adult days at home can be minimized to an average of
6 days per adult. Our conclusion of the importance of high
compliance network-based interventions replicates our past studies
[12–14,16] and those of others who have analyzed data available
from 1918 [15,24–27]. All of these findings played a role in the
recent transition in emphasis within the medical and public health
community from planned reliance on antiviral prophylaxis to that
of layered non-pharmaceutical interventions [25,28]. Reducing
our strategic dependence on antivirals is further emphasized by
studies that show influenza viruses with pandemic potential could
exhibit lower sensitivity or develop resistance to available antivirals
[29,30–33]. Societal support of parents with children is a critical
component for school closure, as families will bear the vast
majority of the costs of the resulting adult days at home.
Mechanisms including private (company emergency planning
and insurance), public (community organization, policy develop-
ment), and not-for-profit resources could be employed to
accomplish a great deal in redistribution of burden.
The second critical recommendation is that a uniform national
community mitigation policy should be applied for the benefit of
all. Isolated communities implementing effective community
mitigation strategies or communities embedded within regions
implementing effective mitigation strategies perform equally here.
However, simulations in which the community was alone in
implementing strategies (local-only mitigation with external
contacts through the workplace), show the necessity of regional
implementation. Without such regional policy, the best commu-
nity mitigation strategy still reduces infection rates to less than 10
percent. However, infection and death rates quadruple from their
values for the regionally mitigated epidemic, as do antiviral
requirements (to 9 percent coverage). The number of days adults
are at home also double. Leaving mitigation policy up to
individual communities could cost the nation a great deal.
The third critical recommendation for policy is that if pre-
pandemic vaccine is available at currently proposed stockpile levels
(roughly 7 percent coverage and an assumed 50-percent efficacy at
prevention of transmission), the best community mitigation strategy
should stillbe implemented.Simulationsshowthat the most optimal
focus of pre-pandemic vaccination in an otherwise unmitigated
epidemic at proposed stockpile levels is on children and teens when
considering outcomes of infection and clinical illness. However, if
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pandemic vaccine at proposed stockpiles levels [20] affords little
added benefit regardless of the population sector targeted. This pre-
pandemic vaccine might then best be targeted to adultswho support
critical infrastructure (e.g., emergency responders and healthcare,
security, and vital utilities workers). Thus, for highest community
benefit, individuals who cannot be replaced in infrastructures that
must remain operable, such as healthcare and emergency response,
should be given the pre-pandemic vaccine. Future studies should
evaluate whether a larger pre-pandemic vaccine stockpile and
improved vaccine effectiveness would yield enough benefit to
change the choice of best community mitigation strategies and our
recommendation for policy.
As has been correctly pointed out in an Institute of Medicine
review [25], there is uncertainty associated with the predictive
ability of pandemic influenza modeling. This uncertainty is fed by
our incomplete empirical knowledge of influenza biology and
epidemiology, as well as the effectiveness of and public compliance
with mitigation interventions. Some of this uncertainty results from
the composition of models that are applied to real-world problems.
Models can be built to try to emulate the real world and as a result,
are extraordinarily complex. Reviewers call for better quantifica-
tion of model uncertainty [25,34]. Simulation studies such as ours
can avoid much uncertainty by focusing on finding the best
strategies for policy consideration and then testing sensitivity of the
best strategy choice to perturbations in model parameters and
underlying assumptions. Our study elaborates this approach and
provides a foundational set of results. This community-scale model
focuses on critical components for the local spread of disease—the
community structure and use of mitigation strategies. The greatest
uncertainties in computational modeling, those associated with the
initiation and path of a global pandemic, are avoided. Commu-
nity-scale analyses can be readily refined in response to evolving
knowledge of influenza biology and epidemiology, individual and
community behavior, characterization of social contact networks,
and mitigation options.
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